Glauben und Wissen bei Habermas In dem zweibändigen Spätwerk "Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie" (2019) hat Habermas eine umfassende Genealogie nachmetaphysischen Denkens vorgelegt. In einer Tagung an der Universität Wien im Jahr 2021 sind die zehn Hauptkapitel des opus magnum analysiert worden. Da das nachmetaphysische Denken nach Habermas aus den okzidentalen Diskursen über die Beziehungen zwischen „Glauben und Wissen“ hervorgegangen ist, beziehen sich die Beiträge auf ein breites Spektrum an Themen: • einerseits auf die geistigen Aufbrüche der Achsenzeit und die (...) christlichen Theologien und Philosophien von der Spätantike bis zu Luther • andererseits auf die Philosophie der Aufklärung, die sich nach Habermas mit Hume und Kant in zwei Stränge aufspaltet, auf Hegel als Begründer des Diskurses der Moderne und auf das nachidealistische Denken von Feuerbach bis Peirce. Zu den detailreichen Studien über seine Geschichte der Philosophie nimmt zudem Habermas in einer Replik ausführlich Stellung. (shrink)

Was für eine Art von Beziehung ist die Erkenntnisbeziehung? Ihre geläufige Konzeption im Sinne einer linearen Subjekt-Objekt-Beziehung bildet so etwas wie den Boden, bzw. das logische Rückgrat der Erkenntnistheorie. Von ihr leiten sich weitestgehend die Annahmen, Vorstellungen und Begriffe her, in denen wir über Erkenntnis (als Tätigkeit und als Produkt) kommunizieren. Und insofern ist sie auf informelle oder explizite Weise auch ein Kernelement unserer Auffassung von Wissenschaft. Die Bezeichnung als 'logisches Rückgrat' der Erkenntnistheorie verweist dabei zugleich auf ihren heuristisch-funktionalen Zusammenhang (...) mit der zentralen Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie, nämlich der rationalen Rekonstruktion der Beziehung zwischen Inhalt und Gegenstand der Erkenntnis. Es ist diese Aufgabe, die den meta-wissenschaftlichen Status und Anspruch der Erkenntnistheorie begründet. Die genannte Konzeption widerspricht aber zugleich ganz grundlegend unserem Selbstverständnis als 'Teil der Natur' (d.h. als natürlicher Gegenstand unter den anderen Gegenständen der Erkenntnis), von dem auch die 'naturalistischen' Erkenntnistheorien ausgehen. Demnach ist der reale Boden der Erkenntnisreflexion grundsätzlich nicht als lineare Beziehung, sondern als holistische Situation zu begreifen. Das eröffnet einen Spielraum der Reflexion und Kritik, die letztlich zwingend zu einer Re-Konzeption der Erkenntnisbeziehung als eine holistische Erkenntnissituation führt, mit umfassenden logischen und konzeptuellen Konsequenzen für das Grundverständnis des Erkenntnisvorgangs, und in weiterer Folge auch für das Verständnis von Wissenschaft. (shrink)

Die Physik nimmt aus zwei Gründen eine herausragende Stellung unter den Wissenschaften ein. Zum einen aufgrund ihrer anerkannten Stellung als Grundlagenwissenschaft, und zum anderen auch durch das Merkmal ihrer offenkundigen Erkenntnissicherheit. Aus beiden Gründen gilt sie gewissermaßen als Paradigma von Wissenschaftlichkeit schlechthin. Mit ihrem Fokus auf das Thema der Erkenntnissicherheit tritt die Wissenschaftstheorie in die Fußstapfen der klassischen Erkenntnistheorie, und darauf gründet sich auch ihr 'richterlicher' Anspruch gegenüber der Physik. Wohingegen die Physik in puncto ihrer Stellung als Grundlagenwissenschaft – sogar (...) beim Thema Erkenntnis, wie der Anspruch des 'Reduktionismus' zeigt – in einem Konkurrenzverhältnis zur Philosophie und zur Erkenntnistheorie steht. Der thematische Fokus auf der Erkenntnissicherheit selbst ist es allerdings, der zur Wurzel eines tiefgreifenden epistemologischen Missverständnisses der Physik wird. Der Grund dafür ist ein zweifacher: Zum einen verstellt die Idee der Erkenntnissicherheit als Kriterium der 'Abgrenzung' zwischen Physik und Metaphysik den Blick auf die viel tieferen heuristischen Unterschiede der beiden Erkenntnisarten. Der zweite, damit zusammenhängende Grund ist, dass die Erkenntnistheorie nicht die Frage nach dem Grund der Erkenntnissicherheit der Physik stellt, sondern die Frage nach der 'Legitimation' der physikalischen Erkenntnis, und zwar, das ist entscheidend, mit Bezug auf die Deutung des Erkenntnisvorgangs. Dadurch fließen wie selbstverständlich alle epistemologischen Annahmen über diesen Vorgang – inklusive der geläufigen deskriptiven Erkenntnisauffassung und ihrer ontologischen Prämissen – in die Deutung der Physik als Wissenschaft ein. Dieses Unterfangen ist folglich nicht nur von Grund auf zweifelhaft, weil es zu seiner Sinnhaftigkeit seinerseits nicht weniger als Erkenntnissicherheit bezüglich (der Deutung) des Erkenntnisvorgangs voraussetzt, und sich dabei auf bloße Überzeugungen stützt, es führt außerdem durch die Projektion des deskriptiven, 'metaphysischen' Erkenntniskonzepts auf die Physik zu unlösbaren epistemologischen Problemen und entsprechenden resignativen Schlussfolgerungen. Der wirkliche Grund der Erkenntnissicherheit der Physik ist auf diese Weise aber gar nicht zu fassen, denn er liegt schlicht in der Eindeutigkeit der Messung. Deren Signifikanz ist aber nur verständlich im Rahmen des originären gegenstandsübergreifenden, dekonstruktiven Erkenntniskonzepts der Physik, dessen Fokus nicht auf den Gegenständen, sondern auf den dynamischen Phänomenen liegt. Der gegenstandsübergreifende, dekonstruktive Erkenntnisansatz bedingt ein völlig anderes, nicht-deskriptives Verständnis der physikalischen Konzepte, und betrifft so auch das Verständnis der Physik als Grundlagenwissenschaft, mit Konsequenzen auch für die Problemstellungen der Biologie und der Epistemologie. (shrink)

Dieser Beitrag erörtert die „übersinnlichen Erkenntnisse“ von Rudolf Steiner zum Thema der Beziehungen von Jesus zu den Essenern. Steiner beschäftigte sich in seinem Vortragszyklus „Das fünfte Evangelium“ mit dieser Frage und präsentierte Erkenntnisse seiner Forschungen aus der Akasha-Chronik. Um die Unabhängigkeit der Akasha-Forschungen von Steiner herauszufiltern, stellt der Autor die Forschungen der Theosophin Blavatsky den Erkenntnissen von Steiner gegenüber. Die Gegenüberstellung verfolgt das Ziel, die Grenzen und Möglichkeiten der Akasha-Forschungen Steiners zu erkunden. Die Arbeit zeigt, dass das fünfte Evangelium (...) von Steiner einige Grundaussagen über die Beziehung von Jesus zu den Essenern enthält, die man bereits bei Blavatsky in „Isis entschleiert“ findet. Dass Steiner die Forschungen ganz unabhängig von bereits vorhandenen Ergebnissen (von Blavatsky) betrieben hat, ist daher unwahrscheinlich. Steiner berichtet über persönliche Begegnungen von Jesus mit den Essenern, die man nirgendwo sonst in dieser Detailliertheit in der Literatur finden kann, und daher hat er einen zusätzlichen Beitrag zur esoterischen Forschung geliefert, der nicht übersehen werden sollte. Eine These, die sich aus dieser Arbeit ergibt, ist, dass Steiner methodisch sowohl den theosophischen Mediumismus als auch die meditative Schau der Akasha-Chronik, die er als exakter empfand, in seine Forschungen einfließen ließ. (shrink)

The Theosophical Society, founded in New York in 1875, was, at the turn of the Twentieth Century, a global phenomenon with 100,000 members. New Age philosopher Dr Rudolf Steiner (1861-1925) was appointed as the first Secretary General of the German Section of the Theosophical Society on 19 October 1902. The Theosophical Society offered Rudolf Steiner a platform, a ready-made audience, infrastructure, and the insider experience of the world’s leading New Age spiritual society. The success of the Theosophical Society (...) demonstrated that there was a public appetite to hear about reincarnation, karma, maya, kamaloca, and other Eastern and alternative spiritual ideas. The Theosophical Society provided Rudolf Steiner a capable, multilingual, and determined personal assistant, Marie von Sivers (1867-1948). For Rudolf Steiner the Theosophical Society offered the perfect training ground for what would be, a decade later, his life’s work, the Anthroposophical Society. Rudolf Steiner grew the membership of the German Section of the Theosophical Society from 377 in 1905 to 3,702 in 1913. He earned cash from ticketing of his lectures and his Mystery plays, and from book sales of his personal publishing house, ‘Philosophisch-Theosophischer Verlag’. Another enterprise, the ‘Johannes-Bau-Verein’ (Johannes Building Association) was founded in 1911, independent of the Theosophical Society, to build a theatre in Munich to present Rudolf Steiner's plays. The building application was rejected by the Munich municipal authorities in 1912. The resistance to a build in Munich, provided impetus for the move to build in Dornach, Switzerland. The Anthroposophical Society was founded 28 December 1912 in Cologne, Germany. Most of the members of the German Section of the Theosophical Society members followed Rudolf Steiner into the Anthroposophical Society. The Theosophical Society expelled Rudolf Steiner from the Theosophical Society on 7 March 1913. The foundation stone for the Goetheanum (then still called the ‘Johannesbau’) was laid 20 September 1913. The Theosophical Society had served as the ideal prototype and springboard for founding and growing the Anthroposophical Society. (shrink)

Die Theorie des sozialen Organismus war zur Zeit des Beginns des 20. Jahrhunderts ein durchaus weit verbreiteter Ansatz der von vielen verschiedenen theoretischen Richtungen in der Soziologie und Ökonomie aufgenommen wurde. Bekannt ist der diesbezügliche Ansatz von Rudolf Steiner. Eher nicht so bekannt ist die Theorie von Rudolf Stolzmann. Letzterer war ein Vertreter der sogenannten sozialrechtlichen Richtung der Nationalökonomie und philosophisch war er ein Vertreter des Neukantianismus (Marburger Schule, Südwestdeutsche Schule). Stolzmann hat Steiners Schriften zum sozialen Organismus nachweislich (...) gekannt und auch zitiert. In diesem Aufsatz sollen Gemeinsamkeiten und Trennendes im Konzept des sozialen Organismus bei Stolzmann und Steiner gefunden werden. Stolzmann und Steiner haben die Bedeutung des Geistigen und in weiterer Folge des Rechtlichen für die Gesellschaft und Wirtschaft in ihrer Theorie hervorgehoben. Steiner hatte aber den wesentlich praktischeren Ansatz. Sein Konzept des sozialen Organismus ist mehr ein Reformvorschlag für Ökonomie und Gesellschaft, während Stolzmann die theoretische und immer gültige Bedeutung seiner Theorie hervorhebt. (shrink)

This paper argues that the ‘scientific dispute’ between Hermann Cohen and Rudolf Stammler is symptomatic of a philosophical movement of left-wing Kant interpretations at the turn of the twentieth century. By outlining influential predecessors that shaped Cohen’s and Stammler’s thinking, I show that their Kantian justifications of socialism differ regarding their conception of law, history, and the political implications that follow from their practical philosophies. Against scholars who suggest that the Marburg School’s view on socialism was a coherent school (...) of thought, I introduce the concept of ‘left-Kantianism’ as an open term that includes a wide variety of novel socialist approaches to Kant at the time. (shrink)

n diesem Kapitel soll das Problem ›Was genstand dieses Kapitels. Wir werden sehen, ist Kunst?‹, wie es sich für die analytische dass sich diese Adäquatheitsbedingungen aus Kunstphilosophie stellt, erläutert und eine Reiunserer Auffassung von analytischer Philosohe von »Adäquatheitsbedingungen« für seine phie heraus begründen lassen. Dieses zweite möglichen Lösungen formuliert werden. Adä- Kapitel bereitet also gewissermaßen den theoquatheitsbedingungen sind dabei Anforderunretischen Boden für die Folgekapitel. gen, die wir an eine potentielle Problemlösung Wie aus der Charakterisierung der analystellen und die eine Bewertung (...) der verschietischen Philosophie im ersten Kapitel bereits denen vorgebrachten Lösungsvorschläge zudeutlich geworden sein sollte, ist ein Charaklassen. Solche Adäquatheitsbedingungen erteristikum der analytischen Philosophie in jegeben sich zum Teil aus der Wissenschaftsdem Fall in der arbeitsteiligen Organisation ihgeschichte einer Disziplin: Vorgebrachte Lö- rer Forschungsanstrengungen zu sehen – ein sungsvorschläge können bestimmte Aspekte Charakteristikum, das Rudolf Carnap bereits eines Problems erhellen, stoßen bei anderen  im Vorwort zu seiner Habilitationsschrift Aspekten aber unter Umständen auf neue Pro-. (shrink)

Der Aufsatz untersucht entlang der Metaphern des Gedichts "Vom Besteigen hoher Berge" die Motivationen und Konflikte von "Gesellschaftlichem Fortschritt", Zielsetzungen und Kooperationen in verschiedenen Gesellschaften.

This chapter explores some of the major developments in the philosophical understanding of suicide in 19th Century Western thought. Two developments in particular are considered. The first is a widespread shift towards thinking about suicide in medical terms rather than moral terms. Deploying methods initiated by a number of French and German thinkers in the preceding century who worked at the then emerging interface between the social and biological sciences, a number of 19th century thinkers ejected what they took to (...) be old metaphysical superstitions about ‘good’ and ‘evil’, and replaced them with (allegedly) hard-nosed scientific diagnoses of ‘health’ and ‘sickness’. Dismissing traditional moral arguments against the permissibility of suicide, the phenomenon came to be viewed as a symptom of decline or degeneration. How variations of this view, in biological and social contexts, reorientated practical responses to suicide in terms of treatment rather than moral condemnation is explored. The second 19th century development in philosophical thought with respect to suicide the chapter considers concerns its place in one of the most significant controversies in Germany from 1860 to the turn of the century: the Pessimismusstreit or ‘pessimism dispute’. While philosophical pessimism might be thought to vindicate or even entail suicide, many of the most prominent pessimists—including Arthur Schopenhauer and Eduard von Hartmann—denied that this was the case, and perhaps surprisingly took suicide to involve a special kind of moral and/or epistemic failing. The chapter aims to elucidate the different arguments which pessimists appealed to in order to ground this position. (shrink)

Ich möchte philosophische Ideen von Hilary Putnam, Crispin Wright, Donald Davidson und George Eduard Moore zusammenbringen, um hieb- und stichfest zu beweisen, dass die beste skeptische Hypothese (gegen unser Wissen um die Beschaffenheit der Aussenwelt) nicht zutreffen kann. Putnams Externalismus, Wrights zusätzlicher Appell an Disquotationsprinzipien, Davidsons wahrheitskonditionale Semantik und Moores Verweis auf seine eigenen Hände lassen sich zu einem vierzeiligen Beweis verschmelzen, dessen Konklusion besagt, dass wir nicht von Anbeginn Gehirne im Tank sein können.

Searching for the origins of 20th century Philosophical Anthropology, it is quite common to follow the suggestions of A. Gehlen who points to Herder as such an origin. In this study, however, I propose a rather different, until now scarcely considered hypothesis: the origin of Philosophical Anthropology can be brought back to Schelling’s reflections concerning Kant’s Critique of Judgement and the problem of self-organization of nature. Starting from his critical observations on Kant, Schelling works out the concept of a succession (...) of levels in the organic, and that of the ex-centricity that defines human beings. Exactly these two concepts will be discussed by Scheler in The Human Place in the Cosmos and by Plessner in The Stages of the Organic and Man. It is commonly assumed that Schelling did not exert any direct influence upon Philosophical Anthropology; one usually allows only for an indirect influence on Scheler, intermediated by Eduard von Hartmann. This paper shows, however, that a documentable, direct influence of Schelling on Scheler can be demonstrated, and that it was decisive for the birth of Philosophical Anthropology. (shrink)

Thinking of problems of aesthetics has a long and strong tradition in Austrian Philosophy. It starts with Bernard Bolzano (1781-1848); it is famously represented by the critic and musicologist Eduard Hanslick (1825-1904); and it is continued within the school of Alexius Meinong (1853-1920), in particular by Christian von Ehrenfels (1859-1932) and Stephan Witasek (1870-1915). Nowadays the aesthetic writings of Bolzano, Ehrenfels, and Witasek are hardly known, particularly not in the Anglo-Saxon world. Austrian aesthetics is surely less known than Austrian (...) contributions to other philosophical disciplines, like ontology, epistemology or philosophy of science. One of the aims of this paper is to show that this is both regrettable and unjustified for the following reasons: Austrian aestheticians have dealt with a number of problems (mainly concerning the foundations of aesthetics) that are salient until today; in terms of subtlety and depth as well as exactness and originality, in general, they easily stand comparison with today's analytic aesthetics; and many of there views and arguments are still worthy of consideration. In this paper, the focus is on a number of hardly known Austrian contributions to aesthetics. These contributions concern the following, partly interrelated, central problems of philosophical aesthetics: i. The problem of the definition of beauty (What is beauty? What does it mean to say of an object that it is beautiful?) ii. The problem of the ontological status of works of art (What kinds of objects are works of art?) iii. The problem of the objectivity of aesthetic values (Do we claim objective validity for aesthetic value judgements, and if so, is this claim justified?) The answers of Bolzano, Meinong, Witasek and Ehrenfels to these questions will be considered. (shrink)

The objective of the paper is a presentation and an interpretation of Władysław Stróżewski’s views on aesthetics. Built upon the foundation provided by classical metaphysics, Stróżewski’s aesthetics is simultaneously a continuation of the tradition of phenomenological interpretation of art. Stróżewski extends Roman Ingarden’s aesthetic theory by including the idea of numinous concretion, largely inspired by the works of Rudolf Otto. As a result, this new phenomenological perspective transcends the narrowly understood ‘aesthetics’ of the work of art towards the inherent (...) dimension of the sacred. Moreover, Stróżewski’s scrutiny of the aspect of art that goes beyond the aesthetic reveals an important relationship obtaining between his insights and the theological aesthetics of Hans Urs von Balthasar. Thus Stróżewski’s ideas turn out to be of significance to contemporary aesthetic and theological debates. In particular, he shows the movement of beauty from aesthetic to transcendental, and ultimately towards the sacred, where numinosum is manifested as Mystery. (shrink)

The article presents edmund Husserl’s idea of transcendental phenomenology in the perspec‐ tive of the project of science. this aspect of Husserl’s writings was pointed out by, for example, rudolf Bernet, man ed Brelage, Iso Kern, eduard marbach, eugen Fink, Ludwig Landgrebe, and roman Ingarden. the main aim, realised in the article is to prove the main hypothesis claiming that transcendental phenomenology is closely connected with Husserl’s conception of philosophy, the idea of philosophy as a science (eidetic and (...) transcendental). the project of transcendental science and knowledge is also connected with Husserl’s conception of transcen‐ dental reduction taken as a mode of revealing those constitutive achievements of consciousness which were covered in the natural attitude. In the paper, I focus on presenting the most im‐ portant points (epistemological, methodological, and transcendental) connected with Husserl’s evolution of phenomenology in the perspective of the project of science. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Schrift unternimmt eine Revision des vorherrschenden Bildes der Rolle und der Konzeptionen von Moral und Ethik im Wiener Kreis. Dieses Bild wird als zu einseitig und undifferenziert zurückgewiesen. Die Ansicht, die Mitglieder des Wiener Kreises hätten kein Interesse an Moral und Ethik gezeigt, wird widerlegt. Viele Mitglieder waren nicht nur moralisch und politisch interessiert, sondern auch engagiert. Des Weiteren vertraten nicht alle die Standardauffassung logisch-empiristischer Ethik, die neben der Anerkennung deskriptiv-empirischer Untersuchungen durch die Ablehnung jeglicher normativer und inhaltlicher (...) Ethik und der Verfechtung eines extremen Nonkognitivismus geprägt ist. Am meisten entspricht die Standardauffassung den Ansichten Rudolf Carnaps, weniger bereits jenen Karl Mengers, Otto Neuraths oder Philipp Franks. Am weitesten weichen Moritz Schlick, Victor Kraft sowie Herbert Feigl von der Standardauffassung ab. Entgegen dem herkömmlichen Bild weltabgewandter Logiker und Metaethiker wurde im Wiener Kreis sogar Angewandte Ethik betrieben, und dies bereits unter diesem Namen. Neben den ethischen Hauptthemen und Ansichten der jeweiligen Philosophen in ihrer Entwicklung im Rahmen ihres persönlichen und kulturellen Kontextes zeigt die Untersuchung, dass allen Ansätzen eine aufgeklärte und humanistische Version von Moral und Ethik gemeinsam ist. Dieser wissenschaftliche Humanismus, der sich schon in der Programmschrift Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung. Der Wiener Kreis findet, liegt jedoch in verschiedenen Ausprägungen vor. Was die Abweichungen von der Standardauffassung wesentlich betrifft, ist ihre unterschiedliche Auffassung von Moral als gemeinsames oder individuelles Unternehmen. Carnap führt ein extremer Individualismus zu einem extremen Nonkognitivismus, in dem ihm Menger folgt. Bei Schlick ist die Lage zweideutig, was sich in unterschiedlichen Moralbegriffen widerspiegelt. Bei Kraft und Feigl tritt das Verständnis von Moral als gemeinschaftlich geteilte Praxisform klar hervor. Auf der Basis eines gemeinsamen Begriffs des moralisch Guten, der auch eine Sachkomponente enthält, ist eine Verständigung über moralische Fragen möglich. Von einem extremen Nonkognitivismus kann dort nicht mehr die Rede sein. Mit diesen Ergebnissen verbietet es sich, dem Wiener Kreis allgemein eine Ablehnung normativer Ethik und einen extremen Nonkognitivismus zuzuschreiben. Eine systematische Ethik, die Moral als Gemeinschaftspraxis begreift, steht einigen im Wiener Kreis näher, als das vorherrschende Bild suggerieren möge. Wer meint, mit engem Bezug zur Tradition des Wiener Kreises nur Carnap folgen zu können und Ethik als suspektes Unternehmen betrachten zu müssen, irrt. Ethik war in der Tradition Analytischer Philosophie nicht immer so marginalisiert, wie sie es in manchen ihrer Teilrichtungen heute noch ist und Gegner(innen) der Analytischen Philosophie vorwerfen. Die vorliegende Untersuchung liefert die nötige Revision einer verfänglichen Fehlentwicklung. (shrink)

Din punct de vedere metodologic, atât Newton cât și Einstein, și ulterior Dirac, au susținut fără rezerve principiul simplității matematice în descoperirea noilor legi fizice ale naturii. Lor li s-au alăturat și Poincaré și Weyl. Eduard Prugovecki afirmă că gravitația cuantică a impus luarea în considerare a unor întrebări epistemologice fundamentale, care pot fi identificate în filosofie cu problema minții-corp și cu problema liberului arbitru. Aceste întrebări au influențat epistemologia mecanicii cuantice sub forma "paralelismului psiho-fizic" al lui von Neumann (...) și analiza ulterioară a tezei de către Wigner că "colapsul pachetului de unde" are loc în mintea "observatorului". DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.20900.42883. (shrink)

Friedrich Stadler und sein Team schließen über 40 Jahre nach Präsentation der ersten beiden Bände das von Rudolf Haller initiierte Projekt einer umfassenden Werkschau Otto Neuraths (1882–1945) ab. In acht Bänden wird auf fast 5.000 Seiten das Schaffen eines Polyhistors dokumentiert und zugänglich gemacht, dessen intellektueller Spannweite man nicht einmal gerecht wird, wenn man ihn als Philosophen, Nationalökonomen, Gesellschaftstechniker und Aufklärer bezeichnet.

Diese Arbeit behandelt die Frage, ob die Christengemeinschaft aus dogmatischer Perspektive Teil der Ökumene sein könnte. Es wurden dazu mehrere Hypothese überprüft und die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Christengemeinschaft inhaltlich zu weit von der Dogmatik der Ökumene abweicht. Eine Hypothese ist, dass die Christengemeinschaft zum gnostischen Strang innerhalb des Christentums gezählt werden kann. Die Hypothese wurde bejaht. Die größten Differenzen finden sich in der Christologie und beim Thema Reinkarnation. Die Christengemeinschaft ist eng an die Philosophie Rudolf Steiners orientiert und (...) 90 Prozent der Gläubigen glauben an die Reinkarnation und an die gnostische Inkarnationschristologie. (shrink)

Die Entwicklung der Philosophie in Österreich unterscheidet sich in markanter Weise von der Hauptlinie der philosophischen Entwicklung in Deutschland. Dabei fällt bei der österreichischen Philosophie vor allem die konsequente Orientierung an den Wissenschaften auf. In der philosophiegeschichtlichen Forschung sind für diese Besonderheit der österreichischen Philosophie z. B. von Otto Neurath, Rudolf Haller, Friedrich Stadier und J.C. Nyiri verschiedene Erklärungen vorgeschlagen worden. In diesen spielen in jeweils unterschiedlicher Weise Faktoren der spezifisch österreichischen Entwicklungen in historischer, institutioneller, politischer und religiöser Hinsicht (...) eine Rolle. Der vorliegende Aufsatz kritisiert demgegenüber bereits die diese Erklärungsversuche tragende Fragestellung: Die philosophischen Entwicklungen in Österreich bedürfen - so lautet die neue These - gar nicht einer besonderen Erklärung; denn sie stellen den geistesgeschichtlichen Normalfall dar. Vielmehr ist eine Erklärung dafür notwendig, daß sich die wissenschaftliche Philosophie und die mit ihr verbundenen Charakterzüge stilistischer Klarheit, technischer Kompetenz, systematischer Orientierung, Spezialisierung und Professionalisierung im gleichen Zeitraum nicht auch in Deutschland entwickelt haben. Eine solche Erklärung läßt sich - so eine weitere These des Aufsatzes - ziemlich leicht aus der besonderen Rolle der (traditionellen idealistischen) Philosophie im deutschen Nationalbewußtsein herleiten. (shrink)

Indem dieser Band sich auf das Verhältnis von Naturerkennen und Natursein konzentriert, thematisiert er einen wesentlichen Ausschnitt aus dem weiten Spektrum von Böhmes philosophischer Arbeit. Um die Naturthematik möglichst breit zu entfalten und für Querverbindungen offenzuhalten, ist der vorliegende Band in drei Abschnitte gegliedert. Im ersten Abschnitt stehen Charakter und Reichweite der wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnis von Natur im Mittelpunkt. Der zweite Teil des Bandes stellt alternative Perspektiven auf Natur vor. Im dritten Teil schließlich stehen der Mensch und sein Verhältnis zu sich (...) selbst im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchungen. Inhaltsverzeichnis Krohn, Wolfgang: Wissenschaftsentwicklung zwischen Dezentrierung und Dekonstruktion. Stehr, Nico: Von den Grenzen der Macht wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis. Schäfer, Wolf: Zweifel am Ende des Baconschen Zeitalters. Kamper, Dietmar: Wissen ist Ohnmacht. Macht ist Unwissen. Gamm, der Technik. Janich, Peter: Zeit und Natur. Kimmerle, Heinz: »Es ist Zeit, daß es Zeit wird«. Wie kann Zeit Zeit werden? Schiemann, Gregor: Natur auf dem Rückzug. Zur Relevanz der aristotelischen Unterscheidung von Natur und Technik. Hauskeller, Michael: Ist Schönheit eine Atmosphäre?. Zur Bestimmung des landschaftlich Schönen. Schmitz, Hermann: Situationen und Atmosphären. Zur Ästhetik und Onthologie bei Gernot Böhme. Rehmann-Sutter, Christoph: Über Relationalität. Was ist das »Ökologische« in der Naturästhetik? Meyer-Abich, Klaus Michael: Erinnerung an die natürliche Mitwelt. Andreas-Griesebach, Manon: Idee plus Erfahrung. Goethes Begründung eines neuen Typs von Naturwissenschaft. Engelhardt, Dietrich von: Madame de Stael über Naturphilosophie, Naturwissenschaft und Medizin in De l'Allemagne. Deneke, Michael: Schramm, Engelbert: »Soziale Naturwissenschaft«. Zwischen Sozialwissenschaften und Naturwissenschaften. Böhme, Hartmut: Enthüllen und Verhüllen des Körpers. Biblische, mythische und künstlerische Deutungen des Nackten. Lippe, Rudolf zur: Eine Logik des gestischen Wissens. Müller, Rudolf Wolfgang: Gernot Böhme - Anima naturaliter japonica. Hoffmann, Gisbert: Das menschliche Sein als mediales. Martens, Ekkehard: »Natürlich« denken?. Heideggers Pseudosokratismus als Irrationalismus. Fleischer, Helmut: Naturalität ohne Naturalismus. Zum lebensweltlichen Fundus jeder höheren Erkenntnis-Artistik. Gerhard: Technik als Medium. Grundlinien einer Philosophie. (shrink)

Kolloquiumsbeiträge des XV. Deutschen Kongresses für Philosophie 1990 in Hamburg. Mit Beiträgen von Herbert Schnädelbach, Hilary Putnam, Karl-Otto Apel, Walter Ch. Zimmerli, Rudolf A. Makkreel, Wolfgang Bartuschat, Elke Hahn und Klaus Vieweg, Roland Simon-Schaefer, Ruedi Imbach, Georg Wieland, Jan Peter Beckmann, Pierre Aubenque, Annemarie Gethmann-Siefert, Gernot Böhme, Dietrich Böhler, Jürgen Habermas, Friedrich Kambartel, Oswald Schwemmer, Dieter Birnbacher, Karl-Friedrich Wessel, Friedrich Rapp, Otfried Höffe, Henning Ottmann und Terry Pinkard.

Philosophy of science sees itself in the tradition of epistemology, whose epistemological paradigm it adopts and on which it is based, namely the subject-object model of cognition in conjunction with the idea of certainty of knowledge and the claim to the 'critical legitimation' of knowledge. On closer inspection, however, its own development turns out to be a deconstruction of the basic epistemological idea, namely the idea of certainty of knowledge. Without this, however, not only the adherence to the linear subject-object (...) model of cognition, but also the claim to the 'legitimation' of cognition loses its binding force. For philosophy of science this means the opportunity to rethink its own task, i.e. to take a step back from the claim of 'critical legitimation' of scientific knowledge to its unbiased reflection, starting from the real, holistic situation of cognition. It is only in this framework that the fundamental difference between the concepts of cognition, namely the object-related concept of metaphysics (to which epistemology also refers), and the transcendental, cross-referential concept of physics becomes epistemologically comprehensible. And the question also arises as to what our notion of cogniton and our epistemological ideas are all about. It will turn out that these are essentially based on an ontological premise, which in reality is gradually being undermined by physics. In other words, these epistemological ideas themselves are an obstacle to an adequate understanding of physics. (shrink)

The question of what ontological insights can be gained from the knowledge of physics (keyword: ontic structural realism) cannot obviously be separated from the view of physics as a science from an epistemological perspective. This is also visible in the debate about 'scientific realism'. This debate makes it evident, in the form of the importance of perception as a criterion for the assertion of existence in relation to the 'theoretical entities' of physics, that epistemology itself is 'ontologically laden'. This is (...) in the form of the assumption that things (or entities) in themselves exist as such and such determined ones (independent of cognition, autonomously). This ontological assumption is not only the basis of our naïve understanding of cognition, but also its indispensable premise, insofar as this understanding is a fundamentally passive, 'receptive' one. Accordingly, just as 'perception' is the foundation, ('objective') description is the aim of cognition, that which cognition is about. In this sense, our idea of cognition and our idea of the things are inseparably linked. Without the ontological premise mentioned we just would not know what cognition is, but it is basically just a kind of image that we have in our minds (an assumption that helps us understand 'cognition'). Epistemology not only shares this basic assumption (which it also shares with metaphysics), but it revolves (unlike metaphysics) entirely around it by making the idea and demand of 'certainty' a condition of 'real' knowledge. As 'certainty' is a subjective criterion this entails the 'remodelling' of the real, holistic cognitive situation (to which metaphysics adheres) into a linear subject-object-relation (which results in the strict 'transcendence' of the objects). And it also establishes, due to its 'expertise' in matters of cognition, the 'primacy of epistemology' over all other sciences. Now, on closer inspection, however, the expertise of epistemology seems not all that dependable, because it basically consists only of paradigms which, from the point of view of the holism of the real cognitive situation itself, are nothing more than relatively simplistic interpretations of this situation. However, we do not yet know what another conception of cognition might look like (which is not surprising given the high rank of the phenomenon of cognition in the hierarchy of phenomena according to their complexity). 'Certainty' as a criterion of cognition is thus excluded from the outset, and thus the linear relational model of cognition appears as what it is, a gross distortion of the real, holistic cognitive situation. The significance of this argumentation with regard to physics is that the linear epistemological model of cognition itself is a major obstacle to an adequate epistemological understanding of physics. This is because it is fixed 'a priori' to an object-related concept of cognition, and to 'description' as the only mode of ('real') cognition. But physics (without questioning our naïve notion of cognition on the level of epistemology) simply works past it and its basic assumptions. Its cognitive concept (alias heuristic) is fundamentally different from that of metaphysics. The acceptance of the real, holistic cognitive situation is, in my opinion, the condition for an adequate understanding of physics' heuristic access to objects, its transcendental, generalizing cognitive concept, as well as its ontological relevance and dimension of its own. (shrink)

The question of what ontological insights can be gained from the knowledge of physics (keyword: ontic structural realism) cannot obviously be completely separated from the view of physics as a science from an epistemological perspective. This is also visible in the debate about 'scientific realism'. This debate makes it clear, in the form of the importance of perception as a criterion for the assertion of existence in relation to the 'theoretical entities' of physics, that epistemology itself is 'ontologically loaded'. This (...) is in the form of the assumption that things in themselves (independent of cognition, in an autonomous way) exist as so-and-so determined ones. This ontological assumption is not only the basis of our (naive) conception of knowledge, but also its indispensable premise, insofar as this conception is a fundamentally passive, 'receptive' one. This is true to the full extent of metaphysics, and to a not much lesser extent of epistemology. The interpretation of knowledge in the sense of 'description' seems to be without alternative. In the philosophy of science, this view is reflected in the emphasis on 'objectivity' as the essence of science, in the belief in 'induction' as the traditional method of science, and (ex negativo) in the problem of the 'theory laden nature of observation'. To these paradigms of epistemology, however, a further aggravating factor is added, namely the criterion of 'subjective certainty' as evidence of 'real' knowledge (only meaningful on the basis of the ontological premise mentioned above). Thus, due to its 'expertise' in matters of knowledge, epistemology becomes the 'prima philosophia'. But what is even more important, the real, holistic cognitive situation is transformed into a linear cognitive relationship, with the consequence of the 'transcendence' of the objects. Now, on closer inspection, however, there is not too much in the expertise of epistemology, because it basically consists only of paradigms which, from the point of view of the holism of the real cognitive situation itself, are nothing more than relatively simplistic interpretations of this situation. However, we do not yet know what another conception of knowledge might look like (which is not surprising given the position of the phenomenon of knowledge in the hierarchy of phenomena according to their complexity). 'Certitude' as a criterion of cognition is thus excluded from the outset, and thus the linear relational model of cognition also appears as what it is, a gross distortion of the real, holistic situation of cognition. The significance of this argumentation with regard to physics is that the linear epistemological model of cognition itself is a major obstacle to an adequate epistemological understanding of physics. This is because it is fixed 'a priori' to an object-related concept of knowledge, and to 'description' as the only mode of ('real') knowledge. The acceptance of the real, holistic epistemological situation is therefore, in my opinion, the condition for an adequate understanding of physics' heuristic access to objects, its transcendental, generalizing epistemological concept, as well as its ontological relevance and dimension. (shrink)

For two reasons, physics occupies a preeminent position among the sciences. On the one hand, due to its recognized position as a fundamental science, and on the other hand, due to the characteristic of its obvious certainty of knowledge. For both reasons it is regarded as the paradigm of scientificity par excellence. With its focus on the issue of epistemic certainty, philosophy of science follows in the footsteps of classical epistemology, and this is also the basis of its 'judicial' pretension (...) vis-à-vis physics. Whereas physics is in a strong competitive relationship to philosophy and epistemology with respect to its position as a fundamental science - even on the subject of cognition, as the pretension of 'reductionism' shows. It is the thematic focus on epistemic certainty itself, however, that becomes the root of a profound epistemological misunderstanding of physics. The reason for this is twofold: first, the idea of epistemic certainty as a criterion of 'demarcation' between physics and metaphysics obscures the view of the much deeper heuristic differences between the two kinds of knowledge. The second, related, reason is that epistemology does not ask the question of the reason for the epistemic certainty of physics; instead, it sets itself the task of 'legitimating' physical knowledge, and this, crucially, with reference to the interpretation of the process of cognition. Thus, as a matter of course, all epistemological assumptions about this process – including the common descriptive understanding of knowledge and its ontological premises – flow into the interpretation of physics as a science. Consequently, this undertaking is not only doubtful from the ground up, because it presupposes for its meaningfulness nothing less than certainty of knowledge concerning (the interpretation of) the process of knowledge, thereby relying on mere convictions; moreover, by projecting the descriptive, 'metaphysical' concept of knowledge onto physics, it leads to unsolvable epistemological problems and corresponding resignative conclusions concerning the claim of knowledge of physics. In other words, epistemology itself builds, due to its basic assumptions, a major obstacle for an adequate understanding of physics. Physics' cross-object, deconstructive approach to knowledge implies a completely different, non-descriptive understanding of its concepts, with consequences that extend far beyond itself due to its status as a basic science. (shrink)

According to the order ethics approach to business ethics, moral rules must be im-plemented by institutions that provide incentives for following the rules. As a minimal (normative) condition, these institutions must be able to motivate the homo eco-nomicus. But even if an institution passes this test, it will only motivate actual people (i.e. the homo psychologicus) to follow moral rules, if they have the relevant compe-tences and self-efficacy beliefs. Consequently, good institutional design includes com-prehensive change management. At this point applied (...) order ethics can draw on find-ings of psychology and experimental economics. It turns out, that role models can support self-efficacy beliefs and are thus more important for order ethics than has traditionally been assumed. (shrink)

In 1968, Jürgen Habermas claimed that, in an advanced technological society, the emancipatory force of knowledge can only be regained by actively recovering the ‘forgotten experience of reflection’. In this article, we argue that, in the contemporary situation, critical reflection requires a deliberative ambiance, a process of mutual learning, a consciously organised process of deliberative and distributed reflection. And this especially applies, we argue, to critical reflection concerning a specific subset of technologies which are actually oriented towards optimising human cognition. (...) In order to create a deliberative ambiance, fostering critical upstream reflection on emerging technologies, we developed the concept of a mutual learning exercise. Building on a number of case studies, we analyse what an MLE involves, both practically and conceptually, focussing on key aspects such as ambiance and expertise, the role of ‘genres of the imagination’ and the profiles of various ‘subcultures of debate’. Ideally, an MLE becomes a contemporary version of the Socratic agora, providing a stage where multiple and sometimes unexpected voices and perspectives mutually challenge each other, in order to strength-en the societal robustness and responsiveness of emerg-ing technologies. (shrink)

Zeitgenössische Positionen in der Debatte über fiktionale Namen lassen sich in zwei Lager aufteilen: deskriptivistische und Millsche Ansätze. Deskriptivisten nehmen an, dass der semantische Inhalt eines Namens synonym mit einer Kennzeichnung sei, während Millianerinnen, behaupten, dass der semantische Inhalt eines Namens sein Bezugsobjekt sei. Da es sich bei diesen Ansätzen um Theorien handelt, die sich nicht auf fiktionale Namen beschränken, sondern Eigennamen generell behandeln, müssen sie sich auch Einwänden stellen, die nicht nur auf fiktionale Namen zutreffen. Dieses Kapitel konzentriert sich (...) weniger auf die Darstellung allgemeiner Probleme, sondern auf solche, die sich besonders im Zusammenhang mit fiktionalen Namen stellen. (shrink)

This paper responds to the Radical Behavioral Challenge to normative business ethics. According to RBC, recent research on bounded ethicality shows that it is psychologically impossible for people to follow the prescriptions of normative business ethics. Thus, said prescriptions run afoul of the principle that nobody has an obligation to do something that they cannot do. I show that the only explicit response to this challenge in the business ethics literature is flawed because it limits normative business ethics to condemning (...) practitioners’ behavior without providing usable suggestions for how to do better. I argue that a more satisfying response is to, first, recognize that most obligations in business are wide-scope which, second, implies that there are multiple ways of fulfilling them. This provides a solid theoretical grounding for the increasingly popular view that we have obligations to erect institutional safeguards when bounded ethicality is likely to interfere with our ability to do what is right. I conclude with examples of such safeguards and some advice on how to use the research findings on bounded ethicality in designing ethical business organizations. (shrink)

The influence that the meditations of Husserl's later years may have had on the younger generation is, as yet, difficult to assess. And it is, in fact, not important whether this question can or cannot be answered. Husserl, obviously, was not less sensitive to the problems arising from the intellectual and cultural situation as it developed around 1920, than were those who have emphatically made the Lebenswelt the primary object of their inquiries and the starting point for the reconstruction of (...) philosophy. (shrink)

It is widely held that our beliefs can be epistemically faultless despite being morally flawed. Theories of moral encroachment challenge this, holding that moral considerations bear on the epistemic status of our attitudes. According to attitude-based theories of moral encroachment, morality encroaches upon the epistemic standing of our attitudes on the grounds that we can morally injure others with our epistemic practices. In this paper, I aim to show that current attitude-based theories have asymmetric mechanisms: moral features only make it (...) harder for attitudes to secure epistemic merits. I argue that, if attitudes can incur moral injury, failure to form attitudes can too. To make sense of this, I contend, attitude-based accounts require symmetric mechanisms, allowing that moral considerations make it both harder and easier for attitudes to attain epistemic merits. I maintain that, once we recognize this, attitude-based encroachment views must soon concede that they sometimes demand we believe against the evidence. (shrink)

Achievements have recently begun to attract increased attention from value theorists. One recurring idea in this budding literature is that one important factor determining the magnitude or value of an achievement is the amount of effort the achiever invested. The aim of this paper is to present the most plausible version of this idea. This advances the current state of debate where authors are invoking substantially different notions of effort and are thus talking past each other. While the concept of (...) effort has been invoked in the philosophical analysis of a number of important concepts such as desert, attention, competence, and distributive justice, it has hardly ever been analyzed itself. This paper makes headway in this regard by discussing three ambiguities in the everyday notion of effort. It continues to develop two accounts of effort and shows how both of them are achievement-enhancing. (shrink)

This paper critically assesses existing accounts of the nature of difficulty, finds them wanting, and proposes a new account. The concept of difficulty is routinely invoked in debates regarding degrees of moral responsibility, and the value of achievement. Until recently, however, there has not been any sustained attempt to provide an account of the nature of difficulty itself. This has changed with Gwen Bradford’s Achievement, which argues that difficulty is a matter of how much intense effort is expended. But while (...) this account captures something important about the relationship between difficulty and achievement, it fails to account for the fact that part of what makes achievements great is that they are difficult in a moderately agent-neutral kind of way. Nor is this thought captured by any other extant account. I argue that to fill this gap we should think of difficulty in terms of low probability of success. (shrink)

Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) reflects an innovation paradigm that acknowledges that market innovations do not automatically deliver on socially desirable objectives, and requires a broad governance of knowledge coalitions of governmental bodies as well as industrial and societal actors to address market deficits. Responsible Innovation should be understood as a new paradigm for innovation which requires institutional changes in the research and innovation system and the public governance of the economy. It also requires the institutionalisation of an ethics of (...) co-responsibility as well as the introduction of new standards and certification processes for products. Dr. Dr. phil. von Schomberg will introduce Responsible Innovation against the background of 6 deficits of the (global) research and innovation system. (shrink)

This Article outlines a vision of responsible innovation and outlines a public policy and implementation strategy for it.

Open science will make science more efficient, reliable, and responsive to societal challenges. The European Commission has sought to advance open science policy from its inception in a holistic and integrated way, covering all aspects of the research cycle from scientific discovery and review to sharing knowledge, publishing, and outreach. We present the steps taken with a forward-looking perspective on the challenges laying ahead, in particular the necessary change of the rewards and incentives system for researchers (for which various actors (...) are co-responsible and which goes beyond the mandate of the European Commission). Finally, we discuss the role of artificial intelligence (AI) within an open science perspective. (shrink)

We reflect on a decade of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) as a discourse emerging from the European Commission (EC) 10 years ago. We discuss the foundations for RRI, its emergence during the Seventh Framework programme and its subsequent evolution during Horizon 2020. We discuss how an original vision for RRI became framed around five so-called ‘keys’: gender, open access, science communication, ethics and public engagement. We consider the prospects for RRI within the context of the EC’s Open Science agenda (...) and Horizon Europe programme, before closing with some reflections on the contribution RRI has made to debates concerning the relationship between science, innovation and society over the last decade. (shrink)

The concept of innovation has entered a turbulent age. On the one hand, it is uncritically understood as ‘technological innovation’ and ‘commercialized innovation.’ On the other hand, ongoing research under the heading responsible research and innovation suggests that current global issues require innovation to go beyond its usual intent of generating commercial value. However, little thought goes into what innovation means conceptually. Although there is a focus on enabling outcomes of innovation processes to become more responsible and desirable, the technological (...) and commercial nature of these processes is rarely questioned. For these reasons, this paper poses the following research question: what concept of innovation is implicitly taken up by the RRI discourse and what implications does this concept have for the societal purpose of RRI? As a first step, we analyze the extent to which the concept of innovation in the RRI literature is uncritically presupposed to be technological. Subsequently, we examine the diverse meanings innovation has had over time and argue that while innovation originally had a political connotation it is only recently restricted to the meaning of technological innovation. We go on to show that even though the concept of technological innovation can contribute to the societal purpose of RRI, this requires certain conditions that are difficult to guarantee. Consequentially, we argue that future research should explore alternative understandings of innovation that better enable the overall feasibility of the emerging frameworks of RRI. (shrink)

We reflect on a decade of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) as a discourse emerging from the European Commission (EC) 10 years ago. We discuss the foundations for RRI, its emergence during the Seventh Framework programme and its subsequent evolution during Horizon 2020. We discuss how an original vision for RRI became framed around five so-called ‘keys’: gender, open access, science communication, ethics and public engagement. We consider the prospects for RRI within the context of the EC’s Open Science agenda (...) and Horizon Europe programme, before closing with some reflections on the contribution RRI has made to debates concerning the relationship between science, innovation and society over the last decade. (shrink)

Praised as a panacea for resolving all societal issues, and self-evidently presupposed as technological innovation, the concept of innovation has become the emblem of our age. This is especially reflected in the context of the European Union, where it is considered to play a central role in both strengthening the economy and confronting the current environmental crisis. The pressing question is how technological innovation can be steered into the right direction. To this end, recent frameworks of Responsible Innovation focus on (...) how to enable outcomes of innovation processes to become societally desirable and ethically acceptable. However, questions with regard to the technological nature of these innovation processes are rarely raised. For this reason, this paper raises the following research question: To what extent is RI possible in the current age, where the concept of innovation is predominantly presupposed as technological innovation? On the one hand, we depart from a post-phenomenological perspective to evaluate the possibility of RI in relation to the particular technological innovations discussed in the RI literature. On the other hand, we emphasize the central role innovation plays in the current age, and suggest that the presupposed concept of innovation projects a techno-economic paradigm. In doing so, we ultimately argue that in the attempt to steer innovation, frameworks of RI are in fact steered by the techno-economic paradigm inherent in the presupposed concept of innovation. Finally, we account for what implications this has for the societal purpose of RI. (shrink)

he Handbook constitutes a global resource for the fast growing interdisciplinary research and policy communities addressing the challenge of driving innovation towards socially desirable outcomes. This book brings together well-known authors from the US, Europe, Asia and South-Africa who develop conceptual, ethical and regional perspectives on responsible innovation as well as exploring the prospects for further implementation of responsible innovation in emerging technological practices ranging from agriculture and medicine, to nanotechnology and robotics. The emphasis is on the socio-economic and normative (...) dimensions of innovation including issues of social risk and sustainability. (shrink)

This article argues that agents can initiate causal processes.

ABSTRACTAchievements are among the things that make a life good. Assessing the plausibility of this intuitive claim requires an account of the nature of achievements. One necessary condition for achievement appears to be that the achieving agent acted competently, i.e. was not just lucky. I begin by critically assessing existing accounts of anti-luck conditions for achievements in both the ethics and epistemology literature. My own proposal is that a goal is reached competently, only if the actions of the would-be-achiever make (...) success likely, and that this is the reason why she acts that way. (shrink)